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Abstract 
This project presents a discussion of what it means to prove something in mathematics. It 
outlines the history of proofs and their definitions, as a point of departure, for a case study 
of whether the proof, of the four colour theorem, by Appel and Haken, is valid and a part of 
mathematical knowledge. The doubt arises from the fact that the proof, due to being 
exhaustive with 1476 cases, is assisted by a computer for the critical part of reducing and 
discharging configurations and is, because of its enormity, uncheckable by human beings. It 
therefore forms a basis for a controversial subject; do computers deserve a role in pure 
mathematics? Some of the initial discussion fuelled by the proof is included. To elaborate on 
this discussion, the project contains the entirely handmade proof of the five colour theorem. 
These two proofs will form a comparison study of what is lost, on a philosophical level, by 
having a computer be the formalizer and surveyor. It is concluded that computer-aided 
proving does not challenge the “infallibility” of mathematical knowledge, but the lack of 
elegance that this kind of approach is prone to, constitutes a problem for the dissemination 
within mathematical knowledge.  
Preface 
This report is a third semester project from the Basic Studies in Natural Science at Roskilde 
University. It is the collective effort of five people spread out over the disciplines of natural 
sciences with common interest, though not experience, in the philosophy of science. The 
project is written so that it should be understandable by an undergraduate student without 
specific knowledge of mathematics or philosophy. 
The proof of the four colour problem is the first computer generated proof. When the proof 
was published it was the centre of the discussion of computers in mathematics, and so to 
meet the requirements for the third semester: Reflection on natural science and the 
dissemination of knowledge in the field of natural science, the project presents a case study 
of the four colour problem as the core in a discussion on the role of computers in pure 
mathematics, and shows how a conjecture can evolve from being just a thought in the mind 
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of an individual to being a controversial theorem, while on its path, helping to give birth to 
new areas within mathematics, thereby indirectly expanding mathematical knowledge.     
With this project we aim at giving a valid conclusion on when a computer should be 
allowed a role in pure mathematics, and what obstacles and consequences this 
implementation entails for the dissemination and understanding of mathematical 
knowledge. 
The project is organized as followed: Introduction, Problem Formulation, What is a 
Mathematical Proof, the Five and Four Colour Theorems, Discussion on Computers in 
Mathematics, Discussion, Conclusion and an Appendix containing an introduction to logic, 
Definitions and an introduction to graph theory. If you are unfamiliar with these concepts 
read the appendices before starting to read the section What is a Mathematical Proof, which 
will contain details on the different methods of proving with explanations and examples. 
The Five and Four Colour Theorems include the history of the theorem and its proof, 
leading up to the section Discussion on Computers in Mathematics, which is a discussion of 
the response from the mathematical community originally fuelled by the proof. If you are 
familiar with the four colour theorem and the methods used by Appel and Haken, and only 
interested in the philosophical complications surrounding it, simply go to this section and 
read on from there. 
By including the history and the original discussion, we will be able to conclude on what 
has changed, with respect to computer use within pure mathematics, since the first proof 
was posted, this will then be discussed along with the acceptance of the four colour 
theorem within the mathematical community. 
We would like to thank our supervisor Martin Niss for his input and patience during our 
discussions. We would also like to extend our gratitude towards Peter Frederiksen our 
opponent group’s supervisor for his help on structuring the project towards readers 
outside the mathematical community. 
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Introduction 
The science of mathematics is an ancient one. From the beginning of civilization mankind 
had a need for mathematics in everyday life: for trading goods, agriculture, counting 
seasons, taxation and so on. This kind of mathematics was mostly based on empirical 
experiences and there was no need for proof, the concept was simply unknown. Euclid (325 
B.C.E.–265 B.C.E.) was the first scholar to bring the concept of proof to mathematics: by use 
of deductive logic and self-evident truths, axioms, Euclid was able to demonstrate the truth 
of a conclusion as an indisputable consequence of a hypothesis, yielding a theorem. 
Thereby introducing not just the notion of a proof but a rigorous perception of truth, a 
priori. This paradigm shift within mathematics; the concept of mathematical knowledge 
shifting from the empirical- to deductive derived truths, is one we still practice today. With 
the proof of the four colour problem as a basis we try to give an overview of the problems 
revolving Appel and Hakens solution in relation to this notion of mathematical knowledge. 
Some conjectures are harder to prove than others, some of the ones that are extremely hard 
to prove become the life of interested mathematicians, whom go through tremendous 
amount of trouble and sometimes end up in no better place than before. At other times new 
connections are made between the conjecture and a theory or new insight discovered about 
the conjecture. 
The four colour conjecture is one of those tantalizing problems that had been floating 
around in the mathematical community for 125 odd years. The reason for the continuing 
interest in the mathematical community probably comes from the simplicity of the 
conjecture; that four colours suffice to colour any planar map, so that no adjacent countries 
are of the same colour. The originator was a graduate of the University College London, 
Francis Guthrie. He showed that three colours are not enough, and so in the beginning of 
the 1850's the four colour conjecture was born. The first claimed proof came from Alfred 
Bray Kempe in 1879, but it was refuted a decade after by Heawood, who presented a 
counter example. Kempe's efforts were not completely in vain; he was able to show that a 
map has to contain a country with fewer than six neighbouring countries, and the work on 
the four colour conjecture carried on from there [Mackenzie, 1999]. 
 7 
 
When the four colour conjecture was finally proven, the year was 1976. Over a century had 
passed since the conjecture was formulated, and Kenneth Apple and Wolfgang Haken 
started their collaboration to solve it. They had been trying to elaborate on Kempe's 
successful efforts, (to put restrictions on the cases needed to be considered), with an idea 
by Heinrich Heesch; constructing an unavoidable set of configurations, making the cases 
finite. Through this, a proof by exhaustion would be possible.  
There was only one problem with this procedure. The unavoidable set was likely to be big, 
turning out to contain 1476 configurations, a set so big that it would take a human being 
more than a lifetime to go through it. The procedure therefore became dependent on a 
computer for the reducibility check (removing a country while keeping the colouring 
intact). A theorem dependent this much on computer analysis was until then unheard of 
[MacKenzie, 1999]. To make matters worse, because of the extension of the computer 
analysis, the proof could not be checked by humans. The four colour theorem became a 
controversial entity which, for some, the very concept of proof depended on. It was felt that 
the proof imposed the empirical evidence of natural science on the world of pure 
mathematics, making mathematical knowledge fallible. Mackenzie (1999) concludes that 
the four colour theorem holds some philosophical problems as to what constitutes 
mathematical knowledge and makes the concept of proof negotiable. We present a 
discussion of this negotiability with the different views of some mathematicians and 
philosophers, demonstrating the discussions invoked by computer assisted theorem 
proving. The contribution of this project is to discuss the pros and cons of computer 
assisted theorem proving and provide a conclusion on its place in pure mathematics.      
Problem formulation 
Does the proof of the four colour theorem, being computer-assisted proof, violate the 
mathematical norms for what constitutes a proof? 
What effects does it, if accepted, have on the perception of mathematical knowledge. 
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What is a Mathematical Proof? 
The concept of proof plays a central role in mathematics, but how do we define a proof? 
What rules do we use when constructing proofs? These questions can be perceived in 
different ways; for a practising mathematician proof is the ‘scientific’ method, which 
provides certainty to his or her work. Philosopher examines the concept of proof and 
nature of the knowledge within it. 
The Euclidian way of proof, following deductive logic is the way mathematicians define 
proof. We start with axioms [Appendix 2], which are basic, self-evident assumptions; one 
does not need to prove an axiom. Definitions explain the meaning of a concept or a piece of 
terminology, the relationships and properties of these concepts are defined by theorems. In 
order for a theorem to be valid it has to follow the inference rule or modus ponens 
(derivation of conclusions from given information or premises by any acceptable form of 
reasoning) [Appendix 1]. Using this deductive logic we construct proofs. Therefore we 
define proofs as deductively valid arguments demonstrating the truth of mathematical or 
logical statements, based on axioms and theorems derived from those axioms, hence 
providing a priori knowledge [Appendix 2]. However, it is not always easy to construct 
proofs by following these rules, sometimes even impossible, and logic here is as central as 
proofs are in mathematics. Mathematicians therefore have to find different ways to go 
about it.  
Three general characteristics of proofs are expected in mathematics. A proof needs to be 
surveyable, formalizable and convincing.  A surveyable proof is one that can be read 
through and checked by a mathematician by hand. After surveying the proof a 
mathematician should be able to come to its conclusion. A formalizable proof must be 
written in a way that it follows from axioms and the rules of logic and the conclusion can be 
deducted from these. Convincibility argument can be a bit vague, different from the 
previous two descriptions. In the mathematical sense, it needs to be convincing when read 
and we can take the actual dictionary definition about this. A proof needs to be convincing 
to rational agents, meaning that any mathematician with sufficient understanding of the 
field, which the proof is a part of, will be convinced of its correctness. In a more 
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philosophical sense, a convincing proof need to have some characteristics, some of which 
are formalizability and surveyability.  
Thousands of years of growing mathematical knowledge brought us many different kinds of 
proofs and many ways to use logic. Even though we are talking about traditional proofs 
there is really no single way or universal method for constructing a proof. It depends on 
degree of difficulty, properties of elements and other conditions. It can become very tedious 
and inefficient if one have to use all the axioms and definitions. Mathematicians can use 
short cuts, already proven theorems, omit “obvious” proofs, use multiple inference rules 
without explicitly explaining every step etc. Different techniques and combination of them 
allow mathematicians to use smallest possible set of axioms and logic rules, thereby 
minimizing possibility of error and making it easier to find the sources of the ideas 
[Appendix 2 – Occam’s Razor], [Krantz, 2007]. For the proof to be valid, however, 
assumptions have to be clear and there should be no doubt of the truth of secondary 
arguments (other theorems). In this section we will discuss different kind of techniques 
used in mathematical proofs. 
Proving Techniques Used by mathematicians: 
Direct Proof: 
Direct proof in mathematics is a most straightforward, it relays on combination of facts in 
terms of already existing lemmas [Appendix 2] and theorems and do not make further 
assumptions. Logic in this type of proof is almost always first-order logic using quantifiers 
for all () and there exists () [Appendix 1]. 
To illustrate this kind of proof in a simple way we choose the set of integers. Before starting 
to prove we assume that the following properties of integers are known: 
 The sum (or difference) of any two integers is an integer. 
 The product of two integers is an integer. 
 The negative of an integer is an integer. 
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Theorem: The sum of two even integers is an even integer. 
Proof: Let’s take integers x and y, since they are even we can rewrite them as: x=2a and 
y=2b.  x+y = 2a+2b = 2(a+b), and from here it’s clear that the sum of x and y has a factor 2 
and therefore it is even. 
Trivial and vacuous proof: 
Consider PQ [Appendix 1], for the trivial proof we have to show that Q is true and by 
definition of implication [Appendix 1] P is also true. We are showing that the conclusion is 
true. In the case of vacuous proof we have to show that P is always false and therefore the 
implication is true. 
Proof by contrapositive: 
This kind of proof establishes validity of the statement by showing the truth of the negated 
statement and since they are logically equivalent the statement therefore is also true. 
If PQ is true, then PQ is true as well. 
Proof by contradiction: 
Reductio ad absurdum [Appendix 1] 
In this kind of proof we assume that statement we want to prove is false and from there we 
show that this assumption leads to contradiction, in other words it is just nonsense. Since 
the statement can only be true or false and we proved that it couldn’t be false therefore the 
statement is true. One of the examples is Euclid’s proof of prime numbers. He assumes that 
there is finite number of primes and demonstrates that this statement is false, so there 
must be infinite amount of prime numbers. 
Proof by exhaustion: 
This kind of proof can be called brute force method simply because it exhausts all the 
possibilities. Firstly, the statement is split to a finite number of cases and then each case is 
checked/proved separately. This kind of proof has 3 stages: 
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1. Splitting the statement up into finite number of cases – e.g. unavoidable set 
[Appendix 2]. 
2. Proving that each instance of the statement has a condition of at least one of 
the chosen finite cases. 
3. Proving the validity of each case in the unavoidable set. 
This kind of proof at heart is traditional, however maybe lacking the simplicity and beauty 
of deductive proofs. It can also be controversial because of use of unavoidable set – the 
finite set [Appendix 2], which really has no upper limit for how many cases there should be. 
In the case of four colour problem computer has to be used, because of 1476 separate cases 
exists in the unavoidable set, consequently it is just impossible to compute so much data 
without help of a computer. 
Proof by Mathematical Induction: 
This kind of proof is usually used to prove some property of natural numbers. Let’s say that 
we want to prove some property P is possessed by all the natural numbers: ∀n ∈ 
NP(n)[Appendix 1]. The idea behind this kind of proof is to show that the first natural 
number P(0) (base case) possesses this property and then by repeatedly adding 1 you can 
actually list all the natural numbers. So the induction step is to prove ∀n ∈ N(P(n)  P(n + 
1) [Appendix 1] valid and has the same property. From here by induction logic we have a 
valid proof for all the natural numbers [Book 1]. 
Proof from philosophical point of view: 
The Euclidian way of doing mathematical proofs has been around for 2300 years and as 
society progressed new challenges in mathematical thinking emerged. Traditional school of 
thought or Platonic mathematics employs the following amongst working principles: 
1. The belief that there exists ideal mathematical entities, which are abstract. 
2. The belief in certain modes of deduction. 
3. The belief that statements can be proven true or false. 
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4. Mathematics itself has no spatiotemporal or causal properties, is eternal and 
unchanging, fundamentally exists apart from the human beings and physical 
world altogether [Davis, 1972]. 
Nowadays proofs can consist of computer calculations (e.g. proof by exhaustion), physical 
models, computer algebra (MatLab or Maple), simulations or combination of various 
techniques. Proofs involving these kinds of techniques are called non-traditional. As a 
result, Platonic mathematics has been questioned and different schools of philosophy in 
mathematics emerged such as formalism, intuitionism, logicism and etc. [Appendix 2], 
consequently altering the concept of proof in philosophy.  Even though some authorities 
believe that Euclidian way of constructing proofs is the hallmark of mathematics [Davis, 
1972], we cannot deny that in the “new-age” mathematical thinking there is a place for a 
posteriori knowledge [Appendix 2], experimental mathematics and empiricism. The 
questions “What is a proof?” and “What are the rules for constructing proof?” requires a 
rather philosophical approach and it can all become a question of epistemic status 
[Appendix 2] of these new mathematical concepts. Many philosophers have put forward 
these questions, for that reason conflicting ideas surrounds this issue, which we will 
discuss in a later chapters. 
Most of mathematical methods mentioned before, exercises deductive logic and are in sync 
with Platonic ways of practising mathematics, however computer aided proofs creates 
discussion in philosophy whether they submit to the traditional/deductive proof category, 
and whether they have ceteris paribus reliability [appendix 2], even though they are useful 
in mathematical practice [Peressini, 2003]. This computational aid by computer in some of 
the methods opened a new niche in philosophy of mathematics, which we wish to explore 
further in this project by the case study of the four colour theorem.   
The Five and Four Colour Theorems 
The four colour conjecture was initiated by Francis Guthrie in 1850s. It was his brother, 
Frederick Guthrie, who passed the problem on to the mathematical community in 1852. It 
was submitted to Augustus de Morgan and the problem started its long journey that would 
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last around 125 years before the conjecture was finally solved [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]. 
The first problem that arises for anyone who sets out to prove the four colour conjecture is 
that it refers to all maps [Devlin, 1988]. This includes all maps we may create in the future 
of places we may not even have discovered yet in addition to all maps that we know. A proof 
would have to cover all possible cases that can be experienced. The four colour problem is 
concerned with the colouring of the geographical regions of a map in such a way that no 
two regions which share a common boundary are coloured the same [Devlin, 1988]. It is 
easy to realize from the above description that the actual sizes and shapes of the regions is 
not an issue, the only important thing is their relative positions to each other [Devlin, 
1988]. More precisely this can be expressed as the topological structure of the map [Devlin, 
1988]. 
 
Figure 1: Topological Equivalence. Each of these shapes is equivalent as far as the four colour problem is concerned [Devlin, 
1988]. 
 
The first announced proof of four colour theorem goes back to 1879. The attempt to prove 
the four colour problem was made by Alfred Kempe and for eleven years the four colour 
theorem was considered proven. In 1880 Heawood found an error in Kempe’s proof. 
Heawood couldn’t come up with an example of a map that will need more than four colours 
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but showed flaws in Kempe’s proof. In mathematics if somebody claims that something is 
true like “four colours suffice”, to prove that the statement is wrong, one needs to come up 
with a counterexample e.g. a map that needs at least five colours. What Heawood showed 
was that Kempe’s proof was wrong without refuting the conjecture i.e. the result could be 
still true.  
Kempe suggested a method to construct a dual of any given map by marking the capital city 
of each country in a map and then if two countries have a common border, join the capitals 
by a road across the common border that does not go through any other country 
[MacKenzie, 1999]. After this step if one deletes the original borders, what is left is a graph 
[MacKenzie, 1999]. The capital cities are the vertices of the graph, the roads joining them 
are its edges and the number of edges that a vertex has is its degree. Together they form the 
graph corresponding to the original map. If one can colour the capitals in a way that no 2 of 
them that are connected by a line share the same colour, so can the original map be 
coloured in the same manner [MacKenzie, 1999]. Kempe used a method that would later be 
called Kempe chains and reduced maps to graphs with help from Cauchy’s work on graph 
theory [MacKenzie, 1999]. Despite the failure of four colour problem proof, Kempe’s work 
lead Heawood to work on easier problem and prove that every planar map can be coloured 
with at most five colours.  
After the refute, one of the strategies to produce a new proof was to reformulate Kempe’s 
strategy [MacKenzie, 1999]. It was this approach that Appel and Haken followed which 
solved the 125 year old problem.  
There are a few notions that we need, to be able to understand their approach. The proofs 
of the following statements in this chapter can be found in [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998].  
An admissible colouring of a map means that whenever we have two bordering countries 
they will have different colours. By map, it should be understood a partition of an infinite 
plane in which there exists finitely many countries that are divided from one another by 
borders and of which, only one country is unbounded. A set of points in the plane is 
unbounded if no rectangle completely encompasses it [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]. Vice versa, 
a set is bounded if it is entirely contained within some rectangle. A map on a globe can be 
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successfully transformed into a planar map by use of stereographic projection. One 
definition of the four colour theorem can be given as: 
 For every map there exists an admissible 4-colouring. 
The basic approach to the difficult proof can be explained quite simply. It is the 
investigation of minimal counterexamples. The following idea form a basis for the 
approach: If there exists maps that cannot be coloured with four colours, then there must 
be one such map having the fewest number f of countries [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]. It 
follows from the definition that any map with fewer than f countries in it can be 4-coloured. 
Any map with less than 5 countries can be easily 4-coloured which implies f > 4. The entire 
proof consists in showing that there cannot exist such a minimal counterexample [Fritsch & 
Fritsch, 1998]. 
A search for this minimal counterexample put restrictions on it and shaped it over the 
years. A few of these can be listed as follows [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]: 
 It will be a regular map (Connected, two distinct countries have at most one com-
mon border line, each vertex has at least degree 3.)  
 If a country has more than three neighbors, then it has two that have no common 
borders. 
 There is no country that has fewer than five distinct neighbors (each vertex has at 
least degree 5). 
 Has at least six countries (this number grew over time up to 96 before the an-
nouncement of the proof).  
NB. Appel and Haken did not use the latter restriction for their proof, since their approach 
was different.  
The transformation from a map to a graph, as mentioned before, is known as a dual. There 
is one important definition concerning graphs: saturation. A plane graph is said to be 
saturated if it is not a proper sub graph (Appendix 3) of another plane graph having the 
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same vertex set. This is also known as a maximally plane or a triangulated graph [Fritsch & 
Fritsch, 1998]. In practice, a plane graph is maximal if no new edges can be added to the 
graph without enlarging the vertex set. 
As the solution of the four colour problem starts with the five colour theorem, let us now 
mention the basic ideas of how the five colour theorem is proved and which concepts are 
used for its proof.  
There are several material resources based on which we completed five colour theorem 
proof for the report. We do not include references in “five colour theorem proof” as we are 
going through the proof itself, not analysis of it; and the proof is fully based on used 
materials. For the five colour theorem proof we are looking at some graph theory concepts. 
It is done in order to understand how from a planar map we can draw corresponding 
planar graph. The materials for a “graph theory” can be found in [Appendix 3]. 
Next, we look at Euler’s formula proof which states that number of vertices minus number 
of edges plus number of faces equals to two (v-e+f=2), and at one of Euler’s formula 
corollary. The corollary states that e ≤ 3v-6; by proving this inequality we are able to prove 
that every planar graph contains a vertex of degree five at most. The five vertex theorem is 
very important for the five colour theorem prove. The theorems mentioned above are 
explained and proved in the report by using materials from course notes written by M. Sofia 
Massa [internet resource 1] and book [Fleck, 2012] pages 210-215. 
Finally, after the five vertex theorem is proved we are able to proceed to the five colour 
theorem proof itself, which we prove by induction on the number of vertices. The proof 
materials for the five colour theorem are obtained from [Keinen, 1974] and [internet 
resource 2]. 
The five colour theorem states that any planar map can be coloured with at most five 
colours. What is a planar graph and how we can draw it from the given map? We can 
determine a planar graph as a collection of vertices (points) and edges (lines). Bellow in 
Figure 2 is shown an example of a planar graph. 
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Figure 2 A planar graph 
 
Any planar map can be represented as a planar graph and by proving that planar graph can 
be at most five colourable we will prove that any planar map can be five colourable as well. 
The example of planar map and corresponding planar graph is shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: From planar map to a planar graph. 
Before starting with a five colour theorem proof we have to go through number of other 
theorems on which the proof is based. 
Euler’s formula 
Given a connected planar graph with e – edges, v – vertices and f – faces the Euler’s formula 
states that v - e + f = 2. We should mention that when graph is drawn on a plane with no 
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crossing edges it divides the plane to different regions – faces. The unbounded area of a 
graph is also counted as a face.  
The degree of a face is the minimum length of a boundary walk of a given face. 
For the first step in a proof we are looking at specific type of planar graphs which are called 
free trees. The free tree is a connected graph with no cycles. As free tree graph does not 
have any cycles it consists of only one face. In case of free tree graph Euler’s formula 
reduces to  
v - e = 1 (v – e + 1 = 2 => v – e = 1).  
Free tree Euler’s formula proof 
Let us say that we are given a free tree graph with n vertices. We will proof the formula by 
induction on n. 
1. If graph contains no edges and only one vertex, the formula will be 1 – 0 = 1 which is 
true. 
2. We suppose that formula works for all free tree graphs with vertices v ≤ n 
3. Let G be a free tree graph with vertices number n + 1.  
In order to prove the Euler’s formula for free tree graphs we need to show that G consists of 
n edges (v – e = 1 => n + 1 – e = 1 => e = n) 
In any free tree graph we can find a vertex with degree one. As the graph does not have 
cycles then by starting from any vertex and taking any direction we will come to the “end 
point”.  The “end point” vertex g will have degree 1. The next step is to remove the vertex g 
from our graph G and the edge which goes into it. By removing them we get a new free tree 
G’ which consists of n vertices (n + 1 - 1). By our inductive hypothesis G’ has n-1 edges (v – e 
= 1 => e = n – 1). As G has one more edge then G’ we get that G has n edges (n – 1 + 1). This is 
what we needed to prove and therefore the formula is true. 
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Euler’s formula proof  
After proving Euler’s formula for free trees we can prove it for any connected planar graph. 
We will prove by induction on the number of edges in the planar graph. 
1. If the number of edges e = 0 we have a graph consisting of a single vertex with one 
face surrounded it. Then we get 1 – 0 + 1 = 2 which is true. 
2. Let suppose that formula is true for all graphs with edges e ≤ n 
3. Let K be a graph with n + 1 edges. 
We get two cases – the first one when K does not contain a cycle which means it is a free 
tree graph and we have already proved that Euler’s formula is true for free tree graphs. The 
second case contains at least one cycle. Let choose any edge on a cycle and call it k. By 
removing edge k from the cycle we get a new graph K’. The cycle from which we have 
removed k was separating graph K to two different faces. After removing edge k the faces 
merge. Which means that K’ has one edge and one face less than K. As K has n + 1 edges it 
gives to us n edges for K’. As K’ got n edges it means that formula works for it by our 
induction hypothesis.  
For K’ we have (corresponding to K): 
v’ = v (the same number of vertices like in K) 
e’ = e-1 (one less edge than in K) 
f ’ = f-1 (one less face than in K) 
By inserting values to the Euler’s formula v – e + f = 2 we get that: 
v - (e - 1) + (f - 1) = 2 => v – e + f = 2, what was needed to be proved. 
Euler’s formula corollary  
For the five colour theorem proof we will need to prove that every planar graph contains a 
vertex of degree 5 or less. To be able to prove it we need to look at a derivation from Euler’s 
 20 
 
formula. 
Let say we are given a connected planar graph J with v – vertices, e – edges and f – faces, 
where v ≥ 3. We want to prove that for a given graph J the inequality e ≤ 3v - 6 is true. 
As an edge forms two faces (one from each side of it) the sum of the degrees of the faces 
equals to twice the number of edges. We are given the graph J which is connected planar 
graph and which means that each face must have degree greater or equals to 3; from where 
follows that 3f ≤ 2e. 
Euler’s formula says that v – e + f = 2, so f = e – v + 2 => 3f = 3e - 3v + 6 
Now let us combine 3f ≤ 2e and 3f = 3e – 3v + 6, we get that: 
3e - 3v + 6≤ 2e => e ≤ 3v - 6, which is what we needed to prove. 
 
Five vertex proof 
We will prove that every planar graph contains a vertex of degree 5 at most by 
contradiction. The first axiom we are using to prove it says that the sum of the degrees of all 
vertices of a graph equals to twice number of all edges.  
For our proof we assume that G is a planar graph and all vertices of G have degree greater 
or equal to 6. As each vertex has a degree of 6 or more we get that: 
6v ≤ 2e=>3v ≤ e (A) 
Where v is the number of vertices in a graph G and e is the number of edges. 
From the corollary of Euler's Formula we have that: 
e ≤  3v - 6 (B) 
 So, from statements (A) and (B) we have that: 
3v ≤ e ≤  3v - 6 
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Which is impossible as 3v > 3v – 6. So, we came to contradiction to our assumption and 
therefore if the graph G is planar it has at least one vertex of degree 5 or less. 
The five colour theorem proof 
Now we are able to return to the five colour theorem proof. 
Let n be the order of the planar graph G, then it is obvious that the theorem is true for 1 ≤ n 
≤ 5. 
We are going to prove the five colour theorem by induction on n.  
Let assume that every planar graph of order n - 1 is five colourable, where n ≥ 6  
Every planar graph contains a vertex of degree 5 or less (see “five vertex proof”). Therefore 
our graph G contains a vertex v such that v ≤ 5. 
By removing vertex v from the graph G we get a planar graph of order n - 1 which from our 
induction statement is five colourable. Let the graph G-v be coloured with five colours – 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 5. 
If one of these colours is not used to colour the neighbors of v, then we are using this colour 
to colour v and are getting a five colouring result for the graph G (see Figure 4) 
 
 
So, let us assume that all of five colours are used to colour neighbors of vertex v (see Figure 
5). 
Figure 4: Five coloring when two neighbors can be assigned same color. 
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Figure 5: All 5 neighbours have different colours. 
Let there be a planar embedding of a graph G and let say that v1, v2, v3, v4, and v5 are 
neighbors of vertex v cyclically arranged around it (see Figure 5) where i  is an assigned 
colour for vi and 1 ≤  i  ≤  5.  
 
Figure 6: Planar embedding of v with five distinct coloured neighbors, where i  is an assigned colour. 
Let H be a sub graph of G - v induced by set of vertices coloured with colours 1 or 3. If 
vertices v1 and v3 belong to different components of H then we can interchange the colours 
of vertices in component including v1. Afterwards we can assign colour 1 to v which will 
produce five colouring of G (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: New colour assignment on the neighborhood of v after the operation. 
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If vertices v1 and v3 belong to the same component of H there exist a v1 - v3 path (P) in G - v. 
The path P and the path v1, v, v3 create a cycle in G (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Two neighbors of v (v4 & v5) that are in the same component. 
It will cause v2 or both v4 and v5 to be enclosed which means there does not exist v2 - v4 nor 
a v2 - v5 path in G - v. Let us say that F is a sub graph of G - v induced by the set of vertices 
coloured by colour 2 or 4 (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9: Two neighbors of v that are not in the same component. 
As v2 and v4 belong to different components of sub graph F we can interchange colours of 
the vertices in component including v2 and by assigning colour 2 to v we are getting five 
colouring of G (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: Five colouring of the original graph. 
So, by looking at all possible variations it can be said that the five colours suffice.  
There are a few more things worth to mention before we go further with the report. With 
the five colour theorem proof we were going through a number of other theorems and their 
proofs which was a great example of how mathematical proofs work. The types of proofs 
used here are proof by induction and proof by contradiction. 
Let us now go back to the four colour theorem by continuing with even more definitions. 
Normal Maps, An Unavoidable Set of Configurations and Reducibility 
A normal map is defined as one in which no country is entirely surrounded by another, and 
in which no more than three countries meet at any one point [MacKenzie, 1999]. The idea is 
to simplify the problem by showing that any map can be modified into a normal map which 
requires as many colours [MacKenzie, 1999]. Recall that a minimal five chromatic map is 
the map containing the lowest number of countries for which there exist an admissible five 
colouring. Using normal maps and minimal counter example together, the idea is that if you 
can find a reduction operation which will reduce the size of your map by even one country, 
without altering the requirement for five colours, you will at once have a contradiction 
since the reduced map can be colourable with 4 colours while still being not colourable by 
less than 5 [Devlin, 1988].  
Kempe had shown that any normal map must contain a country with fewer than six 
neighbors [MacKenzie, 1999]. So the following set of configurations is unavoidable, a 
country having: two, three, four or five neighbors [MacKenzie, 1999]. One of these 
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configurations must appear in any normal map. A country having only one neighbor (when 
one country is covered completely by another) is already considered in the case of normal 
maps.  Appel and Haken’s work is to find an unavoidable set of configurations all of which 
are reducible, therefore completing the proof. The problem with this approach is the 
immense number of unavoidable configurations that needs to be checked. In 1948 Heinrich 
Heesch estimated the set of reducible configurations might have about 10.000 members 
[MacKenzie, 1999].  He would later develop a technique called D – reduction, which is 
highly algorithmic that it was possible to be implemented on a computer [Saaty & Kainen 
1977]. 
One important concept that needs to be examined is the certain graphs that crop up 
primarily as sub graphs of normal graphs. These are called configurations and their exact 
definition requires some more definitions [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]. 
A combinatorial graph is a pair G = (E, L) consisting of finite sets of E (vertices) and L 
(edges) which is a two element subset of E. Let G = (E, L) be a combinatorial graph [Fritsch 
& Fritsch, 1998]. Then: 
 Two vertices of G are said to be neighboring vertices if they are distinct from each 
other and are end points of the same edge in L. 
 A sequence (x1, x2,… , xr) of vertices is called a chain if they are pairwise distinct and 
each successive pair consists of neighboring vertices. The length of the chain is r and 
the edges that join two successive vertices are called the links of the chain. 
 A chain K in G with at least 3 vertices is said to be closed if the initial and the final 
vertices of the chain are neighbors. In this case, the edge that joins the two end ver-
tices is also considered to be one of the links of the chain. 
 A set R of vertices is called a ring if its elements can be arranged so that they form a 
simple closed chain. The number of elements in R is also the size of R. 
A graph C is said to be a configuration if [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]: 
 It is regular 
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 The outer vertices form a ring whose size >= 4 
 Inner vertices exist 
 The bounded faces have triangular borders 
 Every triangle is the border of a face 
The interior domain of C is the sub graph spanned by the vertices inside the ring and all 
edges that join them. In the graph C, we distinguish between three types of edges [Fritsch & 
Fritsch, 1998]: 
 Inner edges, which join two inner vertices 
 Outer edges, which join two outer vertices, 
 Legs, which join one inner vertex to one outer vertex 
 
Figure 11: Birkhoff Diamond [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]. 
Inner vertices and inner edges form the core of the configuration [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]. 
A configuration is called a star if it contains only one inner vertex, called its hub. In 
particular it is said to be a k-star if it is a star with precisely k outer vertices and therefore k 
+ 1 (k >= 4) vertices [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]. With this definition, we can add another 
requirement on the minimal counter example list: 
A minimal triangulation cannot contain a 4-star but contains at least 12 5-stars [Fritsch & 
Fritsch, 1998]. 
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A useful definition regarding rings is embedding. The graph G is said to embed the 
configuration C if there exists a closed chain K in G such that the sub graph  Ck of G spanned 
by the vertices of K and the vertices lying in the interior domain of K forms a configuration 
that is equivalent to C. The configuration C is said to be properly embedded in G if K is a 
simple closed chain [Fritsch & Fritsch, 1998]. 
A configuration C is said to be reducible if a normal graph containing C as a configuration 
cannot be a minimal counter example. Otherwise, it is said to be irreducible [Fritsch & 
Fritsch, 1998]. A set U of configurations is said to be unavoidable if each normal graph 
contains an element of U. 
The main method used by Appel and Haken for generating the unavoidable set of 
configurations was Heesch’s discharging method [Devlin, 1988]. It was in fact way more 
complicated than this but let us start with discharging.  
The idea behind discharging is to draw an analogy between the graph and a electrical 
circuit; assigning charges to the network so that each vertex has a charge. The charge is 
given by the c = 6 – k, where c is the charge and k is the degree of the vertex. Thus vertices 
of degree 5 have c=1, vertices of degree 6 have c=0, vertices of degree 7 have c = -1 etc. 
From Kempe's work we know that summing up the charges of all the vertices for any 
network yields a positive charge of 12. The fact that the total charge is positive implies that 
there will be at least one vertex with positive charge (q-positive). The discharging 
procedure consist of moving the charges around the network, (for the analogy of the graph 
this means to move the edges around), so that some vertices with positive charge may end 
up with a negative, vice versa, notice that this will not affect the overall charge of the 
network. The final configuration will then depend on the specific discharging procedure, 
but with any discharging procedure applicable to any map it is possible to generate a finite 
list of configurations, all of which also has a positive charge. The finite list will then contain 
configurations where all possible receivers of positive charges are included. Any network 
will contain at least one of these configurations i.e. the finite list of configurations is 
unavoidable.   
At this point one might wonder how we get from infinite possibilities to finite numbers for 
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the unavoidable set. The answer lies in the probability argument of the proof. To begin 
with, the qualitative behavior of the probability that a configuration is reducible is 
examined.  
m and n rule: for given ring size n, the likelihood of reducibility increases rapidly with the 
number m of the vertices inside the ring. In particular, if any configuration satisfies: 
𝑚 >  
3𝑛
2
− 6 
Then it contains an obstacle free sub-configuration that also satisfies the above inequality, 
and is almost certainly reducible (no counter examples are known) [Appel & Haken, 1986]. 
For a configuration R of fixed ring size n, as the number of m of the vertices in R exceeds 
some critical value, R becomes very likely to reduce. The argument in the original proof 
estimates the critical value of n is certainly <= 17 and probably <=14. Rather than using 17, 
they actually insisted on using ring size not exceeding 14. If the discharging procedure 
produced a configuration of size 15, the procedure is modified to yield only configurations 
of smaller ring size. Incidentally, using 14 instead of 17 had the benefit of decreasing the 
time required to run the final experiment from four years to six months [Saaty & Kainen, 
1977]. 
Appel and Haken’s computer program for discharge and reducibility was built as follows. 
They first obtained reasonable criteria for the likely reducibility of configurations and then 
modified Heesch’s original discharging algorithm so that the unavoidable sets produced 
contained only configurations which were likely to reduce [Saaty & Kainen, 1977].  In 1971 
Heesch contributed another key observation: he noted three reduction obstacles whose 
presence inhibits the reducibility of a configuration. A configuration R is called 
geographically good if it does not contain either of these obstacles [Saaty & Kainen, 1977]: 
 A four-legger vertex – a vertex R connected with four or more vertices in the ring Q 
surrounding R. 
 A three-legger articulation vertex – a vertex whose removal separates R and which 
is connected to three or more vertices in Q. 
 29 
 
 A hanging 5-5 pair – a pair of adjacent five-vertices connected by edges to only one 
other vertex of the configuration. 
Configurations which avoid these three reduction obstacles are termed likely to reduce. 
Appel and Haken saw that they could use these ideas to develop a systematic method for 
trying to prove the four colour conjecture. Begin with Heesch discharging algorithm or 
some variant. Try and manipulate the procedure so that all the configurations in the 
unavoidable set are likely to be reducible. When such an unavoidable set is found, test each 
of its elements to show either directly that it is reducible or that it contains a configuration 
which was previously proved reducible. If some configuration cannot be shown reducible 
go back to discharging algorithm and change it to replace the offending configuration with 
other likely-to-reduce configurations [Saaty & Kainen, 1977].  An algorithm schema of this 
process would look like below: 
 
Figure 12: Appel Haken 4CC Proof Algorithm [Saaty & Kainen, 1977]. 
The final count for the set of unavoidable configurations was 1478 and all of these 
configuration were proved to be reducible thus four colour conjecture was proved. 
However it should be noted that their discharging rules in the end topped over 300 and as 
shown later were not the most efficient ones, but of course they were efficient enough to do 
the job [Appel & Haken, 1986]. 
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Appel and Haken later wrote that some mistakes were found in their proof and all of them 
were corrected. Due to the way the proof is built it is almost certain that any mistake that 
can be found within the computer parts of the proof can be corrected. They distinguish 
several degrees of seriousness [Appel & Haken, 1986]: 
1. The least serious possibility is that the q-positive (charge distribution after a dis-
charge procedure) situation does contain some reducible configuration in U but a 
wrong entry was made in the bookkeeping lists. Such an error can be corrected in a 
few minutes. 
2. The q-positive situation may contain a reducible configuration but one that is not a 
member of U and whose reducibility may not have been proved. One way to correct 
such an error is to perform another computation to verify the reducibility of the 
configuration and add it to U. 
3. The q-positive situation may not contain any reducible configuration (or at least no 
configuration whose reducibility is easily proven by the programs). In this case they 
treat the situation exactly as they treated the thousands of bad situations that 
arouse in construction of the discharge procedures and modify some of the proce-
dures. In this case the repair can take up to a few days. 
By 1993, different discharging procedures (32 in total), more powerful proofs of 
reducibility lead to the unavoidable set of only 633 members (This proof is by Neil 
Robertson, Daniel P.Sander, Paul Seymour and Robin Thomas). 
In 2005, Dr. Georges Gonthier of the Microsoft Research in England used a new computer 
technology to verify a proof of the four colour theorem [internet resource 3]. According to 
Keith Devlin, this new result is particularly significant due to the use of Coq, a widely used 
general purpose utility, which can be verified experimentally [internet resource 4]. He 
believes this will put to rest any doubts about the proof [internet resource 4].  
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Discussion on Philosophy of Computers in Mathematics 
As mentioned in the introduction a discussion was raised over whether computers, and to 
some an empirical approach to mathematics, change the way of how a proof could be 
acquired. The theorem was entirely rejected as a theorem by some, e.g. Bonsall (1982) 
considers computer-aided proofs “pseudo mathematics”, to others its acceptance meant 
that the definition of what constitutes a proof needed to be changed. As a result, a debate 
started and many articles were published in the areas of mathematics and philosophy. It 
was the proof of four colour theorem that fueled this controversial discussion of computers 
in pure mathematics. We will now present excerpts from a selection of those articles, 
showing the different approaches scientists had towards this new tool being used in 
mathematics, and in our case study pointed towards the four colour theorem. 
When Tymoczko's article “The four-colour problem and its philosophical significance” got 
published in the Journal of Philosophy in 1979, it invoked a lot of response from the 
mathematical and philosophical society, discussing Tymoczko's reasoning and assumptions 
on how computers are being used within mathematics, discussing whether computer-aided 
proofs are viable. The viability of a proof as stated by Tymoczko is dependent on whether 
it's surveyable, convincing and formalizable. Tymoczko ,like Bonsall, seems to question the 
acceptance of the computer as a mathematical aid, “They can contain “bugs,” or flaws that 
go unnoticed for a long time”[Tymoczko, 1979, p.74] For certain this can easily be 
debunked by the thought that it would be the same for a pen and paper proof written by 
hand without the aid of computers, but still leaving possibilities to make mistakes. 
Tymoczko advocates the believe that one should distinguish between the old four colour 
problem and the new. Where the old problem is the purely mathematical four colour 
theorem, and the new four colour problem is the philosophical question of whether a 
computer aided proof constitutes a theorem or not. What should be pointed out is that he 
evidently sees the the four colour problem as solved, “the mathematical question can be 
regarded as definitively solved.” [Tymoczko, 1979, p. 57] but goes on to say that it is 
questionable whether it has been proven. The point, he makes, is that the use of computers 
is experimental and is beneath the eminence of rigorous mathematical arguments. “The 
most natural interpretation of this work, I will argue, is that computer-assisted proofs 
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introduce experimental methods into pure mathematics. This fact has serious implications 
not only for the philosophy of mathematics...” [Tymoczko, 1979, p. 58]. The implications on 
philosophy includes the fallibility of theorems and therefore the fallibility of mathematical 
knowledge, an otherwise rigorous entity in which only a priori knowledge is contained, “we 
must  admit that the current proof is no traditional proof,  nor a priori deduction of a 
statement from premises. It is a traditional proof with a lacuna, or gap, which is filled by the 
results of a well-thought-out experiment. This makes the four colour theorem the first 
mathematical proposition to be known a posteriori.” [Tymoczko, 1979, p. 58]. That an a 
posteriori truth has found its way into mathematical knowledge and that all theorems 
“should” be known a priori is, as Swart points out the main thesis of the article [Swart, 1980 
p. 697]. Swart on the other hand notes that “there are many mathematical truths that 
cannot be verified “in our heads” and can only be accessed by recourse to our physical 
senses – to the carrying out of a type of experiment” [Swart, 1980 p. 699] here he refers to 
the method of writing down, with pencil and paper, and goes as far as to draw an analogy 
between this method and the use of a computer. In doing so he states that the four colour 
theorem is a priori knowledge and is so no matter how you categorize it in terms of 
offloading the task at hand. Davis (1972) uses the terminology “offloading” with which is 
meant the act of out-sourcing cognitivity to other people and or machines. Though Swart 
mostly argues against Tymoczko's refrain from calling it the four colour theorem, and 
directly calls it a theorem, he also advocates the use of a new proposition, between 
conjecture and theorem; agnogram, and that these are what is believed to be true, “It 
should thus be clear that agnograms are neither a priori truths nor a posteriori truths, 
but conjectures to which we can attach a high degree of credence.” [Swart, 1980 p. 706]. 
He goes on to say that the four colour theorem might be put in this category because of the 
uncertainty argument used for the creation of the unavoidable set and not because of the 
use of computers “Most surprisingly, Tymoczko fails to recognize the fact that in so far as 
there is any weakness in the Haken/Appel proof of the four colour theorem it lies not so 
much in the reducibility testing-which is almost certainly correct and has been 
independently corroborated to a large extent-but in the discharging procedure, which 
gives rise to the unavoidable set of configurations.” [Swart, 1980 p. 697]   
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“We've noted three features of proofs: that they are convincing, surveyable, and 
formalizable. The first is a feature centered in the anthropology of mathematics, the second 
in the epistemology of mathematics, and the third in the logic of mathematics. The latter 
two are the deep features. It is because proofs are surveyable and formalizable that they are 
convincing to rational agents.”[Tymoczko, 1979, p. 61] 
Although surveyability, convincibility and formalizability are purely characteristics a proof 
needs to have to be able to check their validity, that doesn't mean a proof without such 
characteristics cannot be right, but whether it constitutes a proof or not can be discussed. 
As Teller mentions about surveyability “It is a characteristic which some proofs have, and 
which we want our proofs to have so that we may reasonably assure ourselves that what we 
take to be a correct proof is so.”[Teller, 1980 p.798] Convincibility hangs on tight to that, as 
something will seem convincing when one can overview the proof, which in turn depends 
on how formalized the proof is, since this will help with surveying the proof. 
If you can't see every step that is being made, e.g. a computer was used for intermediate 
calculations, it cannot be said that the proof is surveyable. This would merely confer that 
the theorem is true, but remains void of the “how is it true?” question, while the “if it's 
true?” is answered. Without being able to tell why something is true, you'll have a hard time 
convincing anyone of truth thus controversy might arise. 
Since making mistakes is but human, and computers are made by humans, they're expected 
to make mistakes, and thus human beings' work and computer generated work, both have 
to be surveyed. As stated by Swart (1980, p703) “... flaws in the computer implementation 
of algorithms are nothing more than errors of logic, no different in essence from errors that 
crop up in proofs that have nothing do with computers.” There is also consideration that a 
proof and a program are more alike than one might think at first glance. They're both based 
on logic statements that are convincible, and axiomatic in their nature; A proof can be 
compared with a program. The axioms are analogous to the input. The theorem is 
analogous to the output while the proof is the program. To find a proof consists of finding a 
program. To verify a giving proof we need only rerun the program.” [Davis, 1972 p.256]. 
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Davis (1972) states interesting ideas about the probabilities concerning the amount of 
errors made by man and machine, and how a computer gets to its errors. Interesting is the 
idea that indeed a computer might make errors, but it computes at a very high speed 
compared to humans. So the amount of errors might be higher than the amount of errors a 
human would make within the same time frame. What should be taken into account is that 
there's a lot more work done within that same time frame. 
“Proofs cannot be too long, else their probabilities...” to be correct “... go down and they 
baffle the checking process. To put it in another way: all really deep theorems are false (or 
at best unproved or unprovable). All true theorems are trivial.”[Davis, 1972 p.260] A bold 
statement by Davis after he discusses the probabilistics of symbols used in mathematics, 
which, when written down, can never be the same on microscopic level. So this introduces 
the probability of misinterpretation. An example is given by him with written one's and/or 
sevens to illustrate the simplicity with which certain errors could occur.  Below the figure 
Davis (1972) used to illustrate this, also notable is that Davis wrote this article as a general 
discussion about this subject, and was written long before Appel  & Haken came with their 
proof and started this controversy. 
 
Figure 13: 1s or 7s ? [Davis 1972 p.256] 
Although this example fixates on handwriting, nowadays we have the possibilities to scan 
printed pages, or handwritten pages, and use text-recognition, which could introduce these 
handwritten problems into machines. Davis considers a future in which we will adapt to the 
increased amount of calculations needed to solve a problem and take the probabilistics that 
come with this into account; “It is possible that a new type of mathematics might develop in 
which the “derivations” or the “processes” are so enormously long that the probabilistic 
nature of the result will be an integral feature of the subject” [Davis, 1972 p.263]. Davis 
reasons that the order of magnitude of mistakes made by computers compared to the 
amount of work they deliver, is roughly equal to that of humans and concludes with “A 
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derivation of a theorem or a verification of a proof has only probabilistic validity. It makes 
no difference whether the instrument of derivation or verification is a man or a machine.” 
Rufener (2011) considers computers as an extended mind in which we can offload our 
computations on a computer. Our brains have always tried to find ways to offload work on 
our surroundings, may it be a leader in a group of people that delegates others to work out 
problems, to come to a communal solution with the group or a calculation worked out with 
pen and paper, because it has to many factors to remember at the same time. Rufener (2011 
p.155) suggests a world X which “... is identical to ours in every way except that everyone 
has knowledge on the rudiments of first order logic. In this world, they too are concerned 
with the surveyability of a proof, so, when confronted with a proof similar to the four colour 
theorem (in terms of length) they divide the proof so that each person surveys and checks a 
segment. With everyone in the world surveying, the task now went from taking a few 
lifetimes to survey by hand to taking as long as a computer to survey and check the entire 
proof.” Thus increasing the amount of work that can be done on one person's idea by 
spreading the workload, or on the other hand using knowledge databases to quickly recall 
information that has previously been offloaded by others. This all helps in increasing our 
cognitive capabilities since one doesn't have to remember everything by heart, but can be 
recalled from outside sources. “So it seems fair to say that when we are confronted with 
mathematical problems or proofs that are too tedious and we are not able to solve them 
with our inherent on-board cognitive capacities, we then adapt and use tools to solve them.” 
[Rufener, 2011 p.219]. 
There are many opinions, views and statements from many people on this subject, of which 
some have been represented here. From people that have funny, bold and interesting ideas 
about how to tackle the computer-aided proof discussion, and whether computers are a 
valid tool or an easy way to extend our minds, or have no place in the pure mathematics. 
Discussion 
A decade after their proof, Appel and Haken were forced to respond to the negative rumors 
that surrounded the proof. The response was ten pages, published in the Mathematical 
Intellingencer, explaining the methods they had used, from reaching the unavoidable set to 
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the error-correction. One reason that rumors sprouted is likely to be that, in 1981, Ulrich 
Schmidt, while completing his Diploma Thesis, found errors in the proof, one of which was 
of degree three. An error of degree three is as mentioned earlier when a q-positive 
situation, arrived at by the discharging procedure, does not contain a configuration, which 
is reducible. This may have seemed like Ulrich Schmidt had found a counterexample to the 
proof, just as Heawood did for Kempe’s proof. However this was not the case. The situation 
had been missed in the bookkeeping and was because of this, not taken care of by the right 
discharging rules. Appel and Haken describes the rumors in the response:    
“A combinatorialist friend of ours, when told in  1975 that we thought we could 
prove the theorem by a method involving computer proof of reducibility 
exclaimed in horror, “ God would never permit the best proof of such a beautiful 
theorem to be so ugly.” When faced with such a proof even the fairest minded 
mathematician can be forgiven for wishing that it would just go away rather than 
being forced to think about the fact that en “elegant” proof may never appear 
and thus our Eden is defiled. Such a person greets news that the proof is 
incorrect with a sense of relief, providing fertile ground for rumors” 
[Appel & Haken, 1986, p. 12] 
This lack of elegance brings us to Tymoczko’s argument; that a proof needs to be 
formalized, convincing and surveyable. Which means a proof should be convincing about 
the accurate results, formalized in theoretic part (from axioms till conclusion) and it should 
be possible to follow the proof. Clearly the proof of the four colour theorem is formalized, 
going from proving lemmas to the induction hypothesis of the unavoidable set to the proof 
that each configuration is reducible, the latter in a way so that even a computer can 
understand it (which needs a very formal language), but is it surveyable? We agree with 
Tymoczko that computer-assisted proofs cannot be fully surveyed in the sense he demands. 
No one has surveyed the proof entirely and it cannot be checked step by step. The last part 
of the proof is exhaustive and can, for the maximum ring size (14-ring), involve 
approximately 265720 different colouring considerations [Appel & Haken, 1986, p. 12]. Due 
to this it is impossible for a human to reproduce or check the proof in its entirety by hand, 
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which can be done by a computer simply by running it again. However the program is 
written in a highly formal language and can be checked by humans. Since a computer is not 
an intelligent partner, it has to perform the operations given to it, thus to check the code is 
to verify that the methods should be carried out correctly. The surveyability of a computer 
aided proof is therefore twofold, and the question is not whether the proof is surveyable, 
but how it can be surveyed. It is obvious that if a computer is required for validating 
statements in an exhaustive proof, then a computer must also have a part to play in the 
verification of the proof.  
There is one very important aspect of computers in mathematics that we have yet to 
discuss, that is the random change of the stored data. During a program run some of the 
data may unintentionally be altered due to hardware errors or software bugs. We already 
mentioned the surveyability of the software i.e. the algorithm and the program, so any 
software bugs can be eliminated. One solution to deal with hardware error is to run the 
program several times and on different systems, which will dramatically reduce the chance 
of getting the same error at the same instance of the program run. This process will make 
the probability of error infinitesimal, but it will never eliminate the chance of encountering 
this situation. We have already mentioned that Tymoczko links traditional proofs with 
surveyability.  This along with the random change of a bit may be the key to why some, like 
Tymoczko, have a problem with computer-assisted proofs, since one mathematician cannot 
check the proof and the only method with which it can be checked is fallible, thus making 
mathematics fallible. Software related bugs are also a possible but basically they do not 
differ from mistakes which could be made by humans which is very similar to what Swart 
stated in his article. Humans misuse notations and make syntactical mistakes as well. 
Actually, calculations made by humans are more error-prone than those of computer. 
People are using calculators or applying computer help to make complex calculations as 
computers are more reliable; so, can computer assistance in four colour theorem proof be 
seen in the same role? If we take Rufener’s point of view that computers are an extended 
mind which we can offload our computations on, above mentioned assistance must be seen 
in the same way. 
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Conclusion 
The discussions surrounding the four colour theorem have been going on for over 30 years 
and it is likely that they will continue to be a part of philosophy and mathematics for many 
years to come. However we would suggest that the matter should be put to rest and that 
computer assisted proofs should be accepted as part of mathematical knowledge. 
Swart suggests the use of the term agnogram for a conjecture that is very likely to be true. 
However as the point of mathematical knowledge is universal truth and complete 
conviction, the adding of such a mathematical concept would bend the concept of proofs so 
that one can no longer trust in the correctness of the assertion and make mathematical 
knowledge a feeble entity. Tymoczko points out the dangers that comes with unsurveyable 
proofs but seems to rejects the use of a computer to do the surveying as he makes 
mathematics out to be a human activity. A computer result can never be trusted to be 
completely accurate, due to the possibility of hardware related bugs, but it should be 
acknowledge that there are methods to reduce the chance of this happening to 
infinitesimal.  
We already accept that when a proof is published, it can have some errors in it. What is 
important is if these errors can be corrected when found. The same approach should be 
considered in computer assisted work as well. As we have stated in the discussion, a 
computer’s assistance in a proof is doing the long and complex calculations that will take 
for a human mind such a long time that it may not be possible to finish in a lifetime. 
However, these calculations follow an algorithm, or the logic of the program, which does not 
differ from a formalized proof. We agree that there is a certain lack of elegance when it 
comes to computer assisted work. This constitutes a problem for the dissemination within 
mathematical knowledge as mathematician that follow the proof will most likely be unable 
to construct the same mental process as the originators, and is therefore left with the 
question of why the theorem is true. 
We believe the mathematical community must let go of some of its strict views on proofs 
and accept the use of computers in this area. The end result may not be considered as 
beautiful as if done without computer assistance, but the likelihood of an error occurring in 
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such a proof is infinitesimal. As the logic of the program in a computer assisted proof can be 
checked, it is our belief that such proofs does not challenge the infallibility of mathematical 
knowledge.    
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Appendix 1: LOGIC 
The content of this appendix is taken from [Chartrand et. Al, 2007] and [Vellerman, 2006]. 
Encyclo paedia Britannica defines logic as “the study of correct reasoning, especially as it 
involves the drawing of inferences”.  These rules of inference or in other words deductive 
reasoning is this kind of reasoning one arrives at a conclusion from some other statements, 
called premises, which are known or said to be true. Deduction is essential for constructing 
proofs is mathematics. Few simple example of deductive reasoning: 
Modus Ponendo Ponens or Modus Ponens - (Latin: "The way that affirms by affirming"):  
Premises:  
Plants that are green have chlorophyll.  
Tomato plant is green. 
Conclusion: Therefore, tomato plant has chlorophyll.  
Modus Tollendo Tollens or Modus Tollens - (Latin: "The way that denies by denying"): 
Premises: 
 If hands are washed with soap, they are clean. 
 My hands are not clean. 
Conclusion: 
 Therefore, my hands have not been washed with soap. 
 
If the premises are true, the conclusion inevitably is true, and the argument is valid. 
Argument can only be invalid if one or more of the premises are false.  
In logic, in mathematics the set of symbols is often used to express logical representations. 
Some of these symbols are illustrated in table 1 below.  
 44 
 
Table 1: Some symbols in logic. 
Symbol Meaning 
 And (conjunction) 
 Or (disjunction) 
 Not (negation) 
 For all (universal quantification) 
 There exists (existential quantification) 
 Implies that (implication) 
 If and only if, iff (equivalence) 
⊻ Either Or (exclusive disjunction) 
 
In mathematics we are usually dealing with statements - declarative sentences or 
assertions. Every statement can be true or false, meaning it has a truth-value. We denote T 
for True and F for False. These statements are usually represented by various letters e.g. P, 
Q, R.  When we assign truth-value to one or more statements we can derive other 
statements and by the rules of logic find out the validity of these new statements. These 
new statements are called compound statements.  For this purpose it is appropriate to use 
truth tables.  For example we choose 2 statements P and Q, and since for the purpose of 
illustrating the rules of logic the statements themselves do not matter we will not assign the 
meaning for them just yet. We can construct the truth table:  
P Q PQ PQ PQ QP 
T T T T T F 
T F F F F T 
F T F T F T 
F F F T T T 
 
So from the truth table above we can see that we can always deduce the validity of any new 
statement if we know the rules of logic and validity of the original statement.  
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 To illustrate this better we can assign statements to the letters, for example:  
P: It is going to rain tomorrow 
Q: Tyge is going to write an introduction tomorrow 
From the truth table we can see that statement PQ is: It is going to rain tomorrow and 
Tyge is going to write an introduction. And again from the table we see that this statement 
is only true if both P and Q are true.  Let us consider PQ: It is not going to rain tomorrow 
or Tyge is going to write an introduction. We can again see that in this occasion the truth of 
the compound statement depends on only one of the statements (disjunction), either P has 
to be false, because of the negation in compound statement or Q has to be true. 
Furthermore we can make sentences for all of these statements of our truth table. 
This kind of inference allow us to create infinite amount of compound statements and it all 
can be followed back to the original statements, therefore the validity of these statements 
are the only variable in this equation of deduction.  
Reductio ad absurdum - (Latin: "Reduction to absurdity")”is a mode of argumentation that 
seeks to establish a contention by deriving an absurdity from its denial, thus arguing that a 
thesis must be accepted because its rejection would be untenable. It is a style of reasoning 
that has been employed throughout the history of mathematics and philosophy from 
classical antiquity onwards.” [http://www.iep.utm.edu/prop-log/- 07 Dec. 2012] 
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Appendix 2: Definitions 
An axiom (or postulate)  
Latin axioma meaning “what is thought fitting” or axios meaning “worthy” it is a starting 
point or first principle for inference in logic, it does not need to be proven, it is self-evident. 
The basic axiom in algebra is e.g. commutative property of addition: x + y = y + x 
[Encyclopaedia Britannica].  
A posteriori knowledge 
 “A posteriori knowledge is knowledge that is known by experience (that is, it is empirical, 
or arrived at afterward)” [Rufener & Casey, 2011]. 
A priori knowledge  
“A priori knowledge is knowledge that is known independently of experience (that is, it is 
non-empirical, or arrived at beforehand, usually by reason). It will henceforth be acquired 
through anything that is independent from experience.” [Rufener & Casey, 2011]. 
Ceteris paribus reliability  
Latin: "all other things being equal or held constant." Statement ceteris paribus is a 
qualification that the possibility of any factors overturning original logic relationship 
between statements in question is ruled out [Reutlinger et al., 2011].  
Conceptualism  
“Take on several forms, but can be summarized as the theory that mathematics is ultimately 
an investigation of the formal properties of the ideas or concepts as the content of thought.” 
Meaning that to construct a mathematical object is to conceptually define it as a mental 
picture of the constructing process [Jacquette, 2001]. 
Epistemology  
From Greek episteme meaning knowledge + logos meaning reason, it is one of four main 
branches of philosophy (other three being: metaphysics, logic and ethics) also known as the 
theory of knowledge. “It is a study of nature, origins and limits of human knowledge” 
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[Encyclopaedia Britannica].  
Formalism 
No more, no less than mathematical language based on axiomatic set theory and formal 
logic. The truth of a proposition is characterized by “formal matters of mathematical 
notation” and can be derived from axiomatic set theory via rules governed by formal logic. 
Formalism thereby states that truths have no meaning unless given interpreting context, 
advocating rigorous syntax in theorems. Thus formalism emphasize abstraction, not origin, 
as to oppose a more general understanding of proofs; a theorem on the subject of a certain 
object is said to be demonstrated, when the construction of its type of object is displayed as 
objects with its asserted properties [Jacquette, 2001]. 
Intuitionism  
There is a fundamental idea in intuitionism that mathematics is created by the mind. A 
proof is therefore a mental construction of a mathematical proposition that shows the 
statement is true. The existence of proofs is then a tool of communication that “serves as a 
means to create the same mental process in different minds”, hence a proof must be 
surveyable and any discussion of the nature of a mathematical proposition, its truth and 
conditions can only take place after a rigorous proof, within a strong mathematical system, 
has been created. Intuitionism does not accept the law of the excluded middle hence 
neither proof by contradiction [Jacquette, 2001]. 
Lemma 
From greek lemma – thing taken, assumption. A subsidiary or intermediate theorem in an 
argument or proof [Merriam-Webster]. 
Logical inference (modus ponens) 
“Inference, in logic, is derivation of conclusions from given information or premises by any 
acceptable form of reasoning. Inferences are commonly drawn by deduction, which, by 
analyzing valid argument forms, draws out the conclusions implicit in their premises, 
by induction, which argues from many instances to a general statement, by probability, 
 48 
 
which passes from frequencies within a known domain to conclusions of stated likelihood, 
and by statistical reasoning, which concludes that, on the average, a certain percentage of a 
set of entities will satisfy the stated conditions.” [Encyclopaedia Britannica].  
Occam’s (or Ockham’s) Razor 
Can be expressed as: “Don't multiply entities beyond necessity” basically it says that you 
should exclude all the unnecessary parts in you theories or proofs and promotes simplicity 
as the “right” way. If there are few competing theories around the subject the one, which 
offers the simplest explanation, is the right one. [Spade et al., 2011] 
Realism  
The truth is out there in the sense that the world of mathematics is immutable with an 
unconditional validity, thus to do mathematics is to discover the existence of real abstract 
entities and the properties asserted to them.  This proclamation means that no matter how 
we define objects through theorems it is the objects that validate the theorem and the 
theorem that allows us to perceive the object. The implications of such an understanding of 
mathematics are that, like other sciences, such as physics, the truth of a proposition is 
autonomous to the method of verification. It is therefore open to a variety of verification 
techniques [Jacquette, 2001].     
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Appendix 3 – Graph Theory Concepts 
This appendix and the figures included are taken from the book Graph Theory by J.A.Bondy 
and U.S.R. Murty, published by Springer in 2008, a part of the Graduate Texts in Mathematics 
series. We will try to summarize the chapters 1, 2, 3 and 10 to explain some of the concepts 
that pass in our project and also give a short background introduction for the readers. 
Some situations experienced in life can be described by a diagram with a set of points and 
lines joining these points that show relations between them. This gives rise to the concept 
of graphs.  
A graph G is an ordered pair (V(G), E(G)) which includes V(G), a set of vertices and E(G), a 
set of edges disjoint (disjoint here means the intersection of these two sets is the empty 
set) from V(G) . There is also the incidence function ψG that associates with each edge of G, 
an unordered pair of vertices of G. The associated edges need not be distinct. If e is an edge 
and u and v are vertices such that ψG = {u,v} then e is the edge joining the vertices u and v 
which are called the ends of e. The number of vertices and edges in G are denoted by v(G) 
and e(G) and these are also called the order and size of G, respectively. 
Example: 
G = (V(G), E(G)) 
where; 
V(G) = {u,v,w,x,y} 
E(G) = {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h} 
ψG(a) = uv ψG(b) = uu ψG(c) = vw ψG(d) = wx 
ψG(e) = vx ψG(f) = wx ψG(g) = ux ψG(h) = xy 
One possible graphical representation of the diagram associated with the above graph can 
be seen in figure 1, where each vertex is represented by a point and edges with a line. 
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Figure 1: Diagram of Graph G 
It should be noted that there is no unique way to draw a graph. The relative positions of 
vertices and the shapes of the edges have no significance. A diagram of a graph only shows 
the incidence relation (ψG) between vertices and edges. In practice, a diagram of a graph is 
often drawn and referred to as the graph itself. 
With this graphical representation, we can come up with some concepts and definitions. 
The ends of an edge are incident with the edge and vice versa. Two vertices which are 
incident with a common edge are adjacent, as well as two edges which are incident with a 
common vertex. Two distinct adjacent vertices are neighbors. The set of neighbors of a 
vertex v in a graph G is denoted by NG(v). 
An edge with identical ends is called a loop, whereas an edge with distinct ends is called a 
link. Two or more links with the same pair of ends are parallel edges. In figure 1, edge b is a 
loop and all other edges are links. d and f are parallel edges. 
A graph is finite if both its vertex set and edge set are finite. The graph with no vertices is 
the null graph. Any graph with only one vertex is a trivial graph. All other graphs are 
nontrivials. A graph is simple if it has no loops or parallel edges.  
A set V, together with a set E of two-element subsets of V, defines a simple graph (V,E), 
where the ends of an edge uv are exactly the vertices u and v. In any simple graph, the 
incidence function ψ can be dispensed by renaming each edge as the unordered pair of its 
ends. In a diagram of such a graph, the labels of the edges can be omitted to simplify the 
drawing. 
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Special Families of Graphs 
A complete graph is a simple graph in which any two vertices are adjacent, an empty graph 
is one in which no two vertices are adjacent (i.e. edge set is empty set). A graph is bipartite 
if its vertex set can be partitioned into two subsets X and Y so that every edge has one end 
in X and one end in Y. This kind of partitioning is called a bipartition of the graph and X and 
Y are its parts. A bipartite graph G with bipartition (X, Y) is denoted as G[X, Y]. If G[X, Y] is 
simple and every vertex in X is joined to every vertex in Y, then G is called a complete 
bipartite graph. A star is a complete bipartite graph G[X, Y] with either one of X or Y having 
only one vertex.  
 
Figure 2: (a) A complete graph, (b) a complete bipartite graph, (c) a star 
A path is a simple graph whose vertices can be arranged in a linear sequence in such a way 
that two vertices are adjacent if they are consecutive in the sequence, and are nonadjacent 
otherwise. A cycle on three or more vertices is a simple graph whose vertices can be 
arranged in a cyclic sequence and is a path. The length of a path or a cycle is the number of 
its edges. A path or cycle of length k is called a k-path or k-cycle. A 3-cycle is often called a 
triangle, a 4-cycle a quadrilateral, a 5-cycle a pentagon, and a 6-cycle a hexagon.  
 
Figure 314: (a) A path of length three, (b) a cycle of length five 
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A graph is connected if, for every partition of its vertex set into two nonempty sets X and Y, 
there is an edge with one end in X and one end in Y. Otherwise the graph is disconnected. In 
other words, a graph is disconnected if its vertex set can be partitioned into two nonempty 
subsets X and Y so that no edge has one end in X and one end in Y. 
 
Figure 4: (a) A Connected graph, (b) a disconnected graph 
For the sake of clarity, certain conventions are observed in representing graphs by 
diagrams. An edge cannot intersect itself and no edge can pass through a vertex that is not 
an end of the edge. A graph which can be drawn in the plane in such a way that edges only 
meet at points corresponding to their common ends is called a planar graph and such a 
drawing is called a planar embedding of the graph. For example the first to graphs in figure 
2 are not planar. 
Incidence and Adjacency Matrices 
Drawings are convenient means of specifying graphs, however they are not suitable for 
storing graphs in computers or for applying mathematical methods on them. For these 
purposes, two matrices can be considered that are associated with a graph. 
If G is a graph with vertex set V and edge set E, the incidence matrix of G is the n x m matrix 
such that: 
MG : = (mve), where mve is the number of times (0, 1 or 2) that vertex v and edge e are 
incident. 
The adjacency matrix of G is the n x n matrix AG := (auv), where auv is the number of edges 
joining vertices u and v, each loop counting as 2 edges. 
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Figure 5: Incidence and adjacency matrices of a graph 
Vertex Degrees 
The degree of a vertex v in a graph G is denoted by dG(v). It is the number of edges of G 
incident with v, for which each loop counts as two edges. If G is a simple graph, dG(v) is the 
number of neighbors of v in G. A vertex of degree zero is called an isolated vertex. δ(G) and 
Δ(G) denote the minimum and maximum degrees of vertices of G, and d(G) denotes the 
average degree of the graph. For any graph, the sum of degrees of all vertices in the graph is 
2 times the number of edges. 
A graph G is k-regular if d(v) = k for all vertices in the graph. A regular graph is one that is k-
regular for some k. K-regular graphs have very simple structures for k = 0, 1 and 2. 3 – 
regular graphs can be very complex and these are also referred to as cubic graphs. 
Isomorphism 
Two graphs are identical only when they have identical vertex and edge sets and an 
identical incidence functions. However it is possible for two different graphs to have 
essentially the same diagram. In this case the sole difference lies in the labels of their 
vertices and edges. This relation is called isomorphism. 
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Figure 6: Isomorphic Graphs 
Subgraphs and Supergraphs 
Edge and Vertex Deletion 
Given a graph G (with vertex set of n elements and edge set of m elements), there are two 
ways of deriving smaller graphs from it. If e is an edge of G, we may obtain a graph on m – 1 
edges by deleting e from G but leaving the vertices and the remaining edges intact. The 
resulting graph is G \e. Similarly, if v is a vertex of G, we may obtain a graph on n – 1 
vertices by deleting from G the vertex v together with all the edges incident with v. The 
resulting graph is G – v.  
 
Figure 15: Edge deleted and vertex deleted subgraphs of G 
The graphs G \ e and G – v are examples of subgraphs of G. G \ e is called an edge-deleted 
subgraph and G – v is called a vertex-deleted subgraph. A supergraph of a graph G is a graph 
H which contains G as a subgraph. Any graph is both a subgraph and a supergraph of itself. 
All other subgraphs and supergraphs are referred to as proper. 
 
